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Forces of Federalism, Safety Nets,
and Waivers
Edward H. Stiglitz*
Inequality is the defining feature of our times. Many argue that it
calls for a policy response, yet the most obvious policy responses
require legislative action. And if inequality is the defining feature of
our times, partisan acrimony and gridlock are the defining features
of the legislature. That being so, it is worth considering what role
administrative agencies, and administrative law, might play in
ameliorating or exacerbating economic inequality. Here, I focus on
American safety net programs, many of which are joint operations
between federal administrative agencies and state governments. In this
context, a central mode of bureaucratic policy innovation comes in
the form of administrative waivers, whereby a federal administrative
agency waives some statutory requirement that is otherwise binding
on state administrators. For example, the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services recently granted waivers to allow several states to
impose various “personal responsibility” requirements on Medicaid
beneficiaries.
Faced with a choice between legislative inactivity and policy
innovation through waivers, many scholars and policymakers of
both parties have tended to favor waivers. The appeal of waivers
as a path around legislative gridlock is compelling. However, I
argue that this view has neglected the federal structure of American
safety net programs, and does not account for the state politics of
implementation. Moreover, scholars have not focused on the severe
information problems that federal agencies face when issuing waivers;
a permissive waiver regime exacerbates these problems. Focusing on
Medicaid implementation, I highlight the risks of waivers for American
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safety net programs. Before concluding, I discuss possible reforms
to administrative procedures, and offer a case study of litigation
surrounding one recent waiver application. The case study illustrates
many of the theoretical arguments, and further demonstrates the
failure of judicial review; it indicates how review might be adjusted
to promote more effective use of waivers and diminish their perils.

Introduction

Inequality is the defining feature of our times. Many argue that it calls for a

policy response,1 yet the most obvious policy responses require legislative action.
And if inequality is the defining feature of our times, partisan acrimony and
gridlock are the defining features of the United States legislature. Congressional
productivity is at an all-time low, and the trend, moreover, is toward even
less lawmaking. One consequence of this development is that any sort of
large-scale scheme affecting inequality that requires statutory revisions is
likely to meet its death in a congressional committee; or if not there, on the
floor of one house or the other; or if not there, by the veto pen.2 A corollary
of this point is that the moving joints of policymaking, it is increasingly clear,
fall predominately at the administrative and state levels. That being so, it
is worth examining efforts to reduce or resist increases in inequality at the
administrative and state levels.
In this Article, I focus on American safety net programs, many of which
represent joint operations between federal agencies and state governments.3
1

2
3

For example, virtually any important tax reform would require the participation
of Congress. For one such thoughtful reform proposal, see, for example, James
Kwak, Reducing Inequality with a Retrospective Tax on Capital, 25 Cornell
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 191 (2015) (proposing a capital tax based on historical values,
and collecting references for related proposals).
For a classic article on legislative gridlock, see Sarah A. Binder, The Dynamics
of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-96, 93 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 519 (1999).
Much of the rise in inequality comes from explosive growth at the top of the
distribution, e.g., Anthony Atkinson et al., Income Inequality in the Long Run,
49 J. Econ. Lit. 3 (2011), and efforts to study the causes and consequences of
inequality will therefore naturally need to pay close attention to what happens
on the right tail of the distribution. However, even as the top of the distribution
tells much of the story in the rise of economic inequality, it is morally important
also to address the left tail of the distribution and those most adversely affected
by the forces driving inequality. Safety net programs relate to just this segment
of the population.
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Medicaid is one such critical safety net program: it is a healthcare program for
lower-income individuals that has been shown to yield gains to beneficiaries
in terms of reduced mortality, as well as increased education, income, and
intergenerational mobility.4 Reflecting its centrality, the program has indeed
been the subject of much recent litigation and political warfare.5
Within this context, a focal point of the agency-state interaction, and the
topic of extensive academic commentary, is the waiver application. A waiver
provision in a statute allows an implementing agency to “waive” certain
otherwise binding statutory provisions. In the Medicaid context, for example,
the relevant agency — Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) —
has granted waivers to states that allow them to use federal funds to purchase
private insurance (the “private option”) and to impose various “personal
responsibility” requirements on beneficiaries.6 Without a waiver, the states
could not have formed these policies and maintained their federal funding.
Waivers introduce discretion into the administrative process, and might, in
principle, be used either to enlarge or restrict federal safety net programs.
For instance, aside from allowing states to impose personal responsibility
requirements on beneficiaries, they also helped the rise of Health Maintenance
Organizations (HMOs) in the 1990s,7 and in the early 2000s they played an
important role in launching Massachusetts’s universal healthcare program.8
Largely as a result of this potential for policy innovation amid a gridlocked
Congress, waivers have attracted adherents from all sides of the political
spectrum. President Clinton encouraged states to apply for waivers, particularly
4

5
6

7
8

See David W. Brown et al., Medicaid as an Investment in Children: What Is the
Long-Term Impact on Tax Receipts? (NBER, Working Paper No. 20835, 2015);
Rourke O’Brien & Cassandra L. Robertson, Medicaid and Intergenerational
Economic Mobility (2015) (unpublished manuscript).
See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 1 (2012).
Jane B. Wishner et al., Robert Wood Johnson Found. & Urban Inst., Medicaid
Expansion, the Private Option, and Personal Responsibility Requirements:
The Use of Section 1115 Waivers to Implement Medicaid Expansion Under
the ACA (2015), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publicationpdfs/2000235-Medicaid-Expansion-The-Private-Option-and-PersonalResponsibility-Requirements.pdf.
See, e.g., Sidney D. Watson, Out of the Black Box and into the Light: Using
Section 1115 Waivers to Implement the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid Expansion,
15 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 213 (2015).
See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 Yale L.J. 1996,
2005 (2013); Frank J. Thompson & Courtney Burke, Executive Federalism
and Medicaid Demonstration Waivers: Implications for Policy and Democratic
Process, 32 J. Health Pol. 971 (2007).
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after his healthcare overhaul failed in Congress; President G.W. Bush also
pressed waivers; and much the same can be said of President Obama. 9
Particularly lately, legal scholars have likewise advocated the merits of
waivers. An influential article by David Barron and Todd Rakoff applauds the
rise of waivers, in large part because they open the door to policy innovation.10
Jonathan Adler, similarly, advocates their use in the environmental context;11
in like spirit, Samuel Bagenstos argues, on balance, for waivers in healthcare
and other policy areas;12 noting an ineffective Congress, Jessica BulmanPozen sees a good case for waivers and other forms of executive federalism;13
and at least in this polarized world, Gillian Metzger concurs in observing
that waivers facilitate policy movement and bipartisan cooperation.14 These
scholars offer thoughtful and balanced views on waivers, but if our concern
is inequality and the viability of safety net programs, this Article contends
that the literature gives insufficient respect to two points.15
9
10
11

12
13

14
15

See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Federalism by Waiver After the Health Care Case,
in The Health Care Case: The Supreme Court’s Decision and Its Implications
227 (Gillian Metzger, Trevor Morrison & Nathaniel Persily eds., 2013).
David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 Colum. L.
Rev. 265 (2013).
Jonathan H. Adler, Letting Fifty Flowers Bloom: Using Federalism to Spur
Environmental Innovation, in The Jurisdynamics of Environmental Protection:
Change and the Pragmatic Voice in Environmental Law 263 (J. Chen ed.,
2004).
Bagenstos, supra note 9.
Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 Va. L.
Rev. 953 (2016) (“[T]aking politics into account, there is a strong case for statedifferentiated federal policy as compared to the alternatives that emerge from
a polarized Congress.”).
Gillian Metzger, Agencies, Polarization, and the States, 115 Colum. L. Rev.
1739 (2015).
The spirit of these points follows Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82
Minn. L. Rev. 317 (1997). Metzger notes a rupture between judicial doctrine
in federalism and what we know about decentralization and centralization from
social science. See Metzger, supra note 14. I also note that others have expressed
caution about waivers in the past. See, e.g., Jacob S. Hacker, Privatizing Risk
Without Privatizing the Welfare State: The Hidden Politics of Social Policy
Retrenchment in the United States, 98 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 243 (2004) (“[T]he joint
federal-state structure of the program . . . has facilitated cutbacks by fostering
interstate competitive pressures in favor of budgetary stringency, while making
cutbacks more difficult to identify and assign responsibility for.”). However,
this type of consideration is all but absent from the more recent legal literature
on waivers; hence this Article.
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The first is that waivers represent a form of managed devolution, and that
forces that operate at the level of state implementation generally, even if not
uniformly, move toward retrenchment. Scholars have long been concerned
that jurisdictional competition places downward pressure on benefits levels,
as states fear that overly generous benefits will attract beneficiaries from
nearby states.16 Moreover, a common view is that it is more difficult for states
to implement counter-cyclical policies;17 budgets are most pressed during
economic downturns, precisely when safety nets have the most importance, and
least pressed during times of economic expansion, precisely when safety nets
have the least importance. To the extent that this form of managed devolution
sensitizes safety net programs to any of these dynamics, it undermines the
core purpose of safety nets and threatens increases in inequality. These forces
are well known, but they have largely been ignored by the recent waiver
literature, which focuses on the possibility of policy innovation rather than
the nature of any such innovations.18
A second dimension of these waiver-facilitated programs is less well known
— but it is at least equally important. Although the bureaucrats working at
the agency level have expertise in their policy areas, they also face severe
information problems with respect to state waiver applications. States, of course,
tend to couch their applications in public-regarding terms that advance the
purposes of the statutory scheme: the waiver request represents an “experiment”
in healthcare delivery, or an “innovation,” or it is “necessary” to implement
the policy under prevailing state economic or political conditions.19 Yet it is
difficult to know what motivates the state’s waiver. The waiver may or may
not be “necessary,” for example; such a determination that depends on detailed
knowledge of local conditions. A permissive posture on waivers is likely to
16 See, e.g., Paul E. Peterson, The Price of Federalism (1995). One might also be
concerned that, even absent this migration-related fear, states with conservative
governors may seek waivers to reduce benefits or eligibility as a way to “show”
their ideological bona fides to a voting public with incomplete information.
The fact that Governor John Kasich expanded Medicaid in Ohio under the
Affordable Care Act, without a waiver, but is considering seeking a waiver to
reduce eligibility now that he is running for president, lends some plausibility
to this concern. Either way, the result is similar: a form of competition among
states driving down benefits levels.
17 For recent evidence, see Glenn Follette & Byron Lutz, Fiscal Policy in
the United States: Automatic Stabilizers, Discretionary Fiscal Policy
Actions, and the Economy (2010), http://www.federalreserve.gov/Pubs/
FEDS/2010/201043/201043pap.pdf.
18 See supra notes 9-14.
19 See infra Parts III-IV.
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exacerbate the tendency of states to falsely represent their motivations for
pursuing a waiver, which may in truth have ideological, partisan, or electoral
roots. Particularly when combined with the structural forces, above, that
place downward pressure on benefits, this informational problem colors our
understanding of how waivers operate and, insofar as one is concerned by
economic inequality, encourages skepticism of the administrative tool.20
These concerns have not to my knowledge entered the recent waiver
debate, but it is clear that — admitting that waivers introduce the possibility of
innovation — we might not necessarily applaud all forms of “innovation.” This
is particularly true where, as in most theories of federal policy implementation,
the direction of the innovation is generally predictable, and where the flexibility
that makes room for innovation also weakens the bargaining position of the
federal government.21 Indeed, such downward forces plausibly prompted the
need for federally assisted safety net programs in the first instance — local
and state efforts proved inadequate absent the presence of federal funding
and statutory standards.22 I stress that these points should be understood as
articulating a theoretical and institutional basis for concern, and not necessarily
as factual descriptions of the prevailing waiver regime. A major motivation
for this Article, that is, is to conceive of waivers as an enduring institution
and to try to understand the long-run forces at play, with implications for
inequality. This perspective suggests that waivers should not be cheered, but
rather eyed with suspicion.
Before closing, I consider how agencies and the courts might respond to these
institutional forces, with the twin goals of ensuring flexibility and safeguarding
statutory objectives. I do so in part through a case study of litigation surrounding
a recent Medicaid waiver for Arizona. This case study vividly illustrates the
information problems that agencies face and largely represents a story of failure
at levels of both the agency and the court; it shows how neither agencies nor
courts can be trusted, without more being done, to ward off unmeritorious waiver
requests. In the main, I argue for greater formality in the procedures required to
receive a waiver, and for more searching review of the resulting record. At least
in the Medicaid context, the Patient Protections and Affordable Care Act (ACA)23

20 See infra Sections III.A, IV.B; infra Appendix.
21 See infra Part II.
22 Shanna Rose, Financing Medicaid: Federalism and the Growth of America’s
Health Care Safety Net (2013).
23 Patient Protections and Affordable Care Act, Pub. Law No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010).
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took positive steps in this regard, but even here procedural reform remains
incomplete.24
This Article proceeds as follows. First, using Medicaid as the running
example, I discuss in Part I the legal status of waivers, their use over time, and
the current perspectives of the literature. In Part II, I present a main concern
with the prevailing view: that it ignores the politics of state implementation,
and that various forces have a predictable effect on policies. In Part III, I
present an argument about how information problems infect state-agency
bargaining in the context of various waiver regimes; I include a more formal
representation of this argument in the Appendix. In Part IV, I discuss the role
of administrative procedures and judicial review in managing waivers. My
conclusions follow.

I. Waivers
Waiver authority is delegated from Congress to administrative agencies in the
manner of any other delegation of authority. What is different about waivers
is that they delegate to agencies the authority to waive or remove, at least
temporarily, otherwise binding statutory provisions. Congress has included
waiver provisions in statutes at least since the 1960s,25 and agencies have
used them intensively since the G.H.W. Bush administration.26 Subsequent
presidential administrations have routinely employed waivers to give states
flexibility in cooperative federal programs and advance policy objectives
in the face of congressional gridlock. Indeed, as others have suggested, this
timing is likely not coincidental: the fact of congressional gridlock and the
increasing use of waivers likely run together.27
The scholarly literature on waivers tends to defend them. Scholars
acknowledge that this sort of “negative” delegation is unusual, and therefore
worthy of consideration, but then tend largely to conclude that, though negative,

24 See infra Section IV.A.
25 As discussed below, perhaps the most common form of waiver — Section 1115
waivers — arrived in the Social Security Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, 76
Stat. 172 (1962), and therefore predates Medicaid.
26 David G. Smith & Judith D. Moore, Medicaid Politics and Policy: 1965-2007,
at 281 (2009).
27 See, e.g., Saundra K. Schneider, Medicaid Section 1115 Waivers: Shifting Health
Care Reform to the States, 27 Publius: J. Federalism 89 (1997) (noting the turn
to Medicaid waivers in the aftermath of President Clinton’s failed healthcare
overhaul).
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it should be regarded like any other type of delegation by Congress to agencies.28
Perhaps the most fertile legal consideration invoked in recent debates involves
various forms of hypothetical “conditional” waivers, whereby the agency waives
some statutory requirement conditional on a state taking some other putatively
voluntary action.29 This form of conditional waiver may be unconstitutional if,
for example, the condition is unrelated to the purposes of the federal program
in question. However, it is not entirely clear why unconstitutional conditions
relate uniquely to waivers rather than to delegations of discretionary authority
more generally. Presumably such conditions might attach in relation either to
the discretionary imposition of a requirement — do X or we do Y — or the
discretionary waiver of a requirement — do X and we undo Y.30
Perhaps as a result of this basic equivalence, most of the criticism of
waivers comes in various forms of policy or value-based concerns. For
instance, some fear that the federal government might abuse waiver authority
to the detriment of state autonomy or other rule of law values.31 However,
again, it is not entirely clear that this concern is specific to waivers; much the
same might be said of the exercise of any discretionary authority, whether
positive, as is usually the case, or negative, as is the case for waivers. More
uniquely related to waivers, others express concern that waivers will allow
agencies, over time, to “disappear” a statute.32 Although statutes often place
limits on the substantive and temporal scope of agencies’ waiver authority,
agencies may undermine these limits by, for example, repeatedly granting

28 David J. Baron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 Colum. L.
Rev. 265 (2013); Zachary S. Price, Seeking Baselines for Negative Authority:
Constitutional and Rule-of-Law Arguments Over Nonenforcement and Waiver,
8 J. Legal Anal. 235 (2016); Daniel T. Deacon, Administrative Forbearance,
125 Yale L.J. 1548 (2016).
29 Derek W. Black, Federalizing Education by Waiver, 68 Vand. L. Rev. 607
(2015); Price, supra note 28.
30 Of course, to the extent that one argues that agencies should not have any
discretionary authority, this would equally affect both positive and negative
types of actions; my point is that one must seemingly attack that rather larger
issue to come out against waivers.
31 See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 9 (summarizing policy concerns on the right
and left about waivers); Richard A. Epstein, The Perilous Position of the Rule
of Law and the Administrative State, 36 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 5 (2013).
32 Jonathan R. Bolton, The Case of the Disappearing Statute: A Legal and Policy
Critique of the Use of Section 1115 Waivers to Restructure the Medicaid Program,
37 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 91 (2004).
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extensions of waivers.33 At least in the limit, this is undoubtedly a serious
concern regarding waivers.
Though not dismissing such policy-based concerns, most observers evaluate
waivers against the backdrop of crippling legislative gridlock. In this context,
waivers seem a welcome relief: they permit play in the policymaking joints,
allowing states and administrative agencies to tailor and adapt policy to changing
circumstances. On this comparative basis, many scholars defend, even if not
quite cheer, the rise of waivers as a method of policymaking. Perhaps most
prominently, in an article aptly titled In Defense of Big Waivers, Barron and
Rakoff argue that waivers represent “an institutional innovation that makes
possible lawmaking for the sake of the general welfare that would simply be
impossible or impracticable otherwise.”34 Bagenstos, similarly, recognizes
the common critiques of waivers, but concludes on balance with a relatively
“optimistic view of federalism by waiver.”35 At least given congressional
gridlock, Bulman-Pozen, likewise, argues the “affirmative case for executive
federalism,” that is, waiver-like activity, in part because it “offers new routes
to bipartisan compromise and negotiation that seem out of reach of Congress.”36
As a window into this debate, I focus on Medicaid implementation for
most of this Article. Consistent with the view that waivers permit play in the
policymaking joints, they have facilitated a range of programmatic policy
innovations over the years in this area. During the 1990s, for example, many
states received waivers allowing them to use federal funds for managed care
programs.37 Even more programmatically, Massachusetts’s universal healthcare
plan — the model for the ACA — emerged in important part through waivers
that permitted the state to apply funds to broader categories of the population,
and to shift funds between programs.38 However, waivers have also been
used in ways that arguably undermine beneficiaries, imposing cost-sharing
33 For example, Arkansas, which received a waiver for Medicaid expansion in
2014, is preparing to apply for an extension of its waiver. See State of Ark.,
Waiver Extension Application (2017) (on file with author).
34 Barron & Rakoff, supra note 10, at 340.
35 Bagenstos, supra note 9, at 9.
36 Bulman-Pozen, supra note 13, at 33-34; see also Jessica Bulman-Pozen, From
Sovereignty and Process to Administration and Politics: The Afterlife of American
Federalism, 123 Yale L.J. 1920, 1945 (2014) (“Especially compared to unilateral
executive action, big waiver to states fosters transparency, accountability, and
political debate . . . .”); Metzger, supra note 14, at 1744 (arguing that waivers and
other state-agency partnerships can “open[] up opportunities for bipartisanship”).
37 Smith & Moore, supra note 26, at 266-71.
38 See, e.g., Alison Mitchell, Cong. Research Serv. RL42865, Medicaid
Disproportionate Share Hospital Payments (2013).
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requirements, for example, that have been shown to discourage lower-income
individuals from participating in the healthcare program.39 Thus, even as waivers
open the door to beneficial compromises and experimentalism, they also invite
ideological program retrenchment and cost containment.40 Moreover, these
retrenchments often come in the “guise” of experimentalism and welcomed
policy innovation,41 a feature of waivers discussed in detail below.42
Perhaps the most prominent recent example of waivers involves the ACA,
a running example for this Article.43 As a result of the Court’s NFIB decision,44
the ACA’s Medicaid expansion provisions — which would expand Medicaid
eligibility up to 138% of the federal poverty level — did not apply unless
the state agreed to it. As originally written, the expansion would be folded
into existing Medicaid programs, and states’ choice would be either to accept
the expansion, or to withdraw from the Medicaid program in its entirety; the
Court’s decision permits states discretion with respect to the expansion itself.
Along with the decision over whether to set up a state-based exchange, this
expansion decision represents one of the main areas of state discretion with
respect to the ACA. This means that it was also one of the main areas over
which state leaders could demonstrate acquiescence or defiance to the ACA,
and by extension to President Obama, endowing the decision with a great
deal of political importance, particularly among Republicans.
39 See, e.g., Wishner et al., supra note 6.
40 For a similar observation of this trend, though in the context of AFDC, see
Peterson, supra note 16, at 109 (noting that though opportunities to experiment
may “seem[] in principle to allow for experimentation in either a more liberal
or a more restrictive direction, the proposals for waiver of federal requirements
approved by the Department of Health and Human Services have almost always
had a conservative cast”).
41 Susan Bennett & Kathleen A. Sullivan, Disentitling the Poor: Waivers and
Welfare “Reform,” 26 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 741, 745 (1993) (“[A]spects of
some of the state [welfare] reform projects appear merely to be attempts to
reduce benefits under the guise of experimentation.”).
42 For a powerful criticism of “democratic experimentalism,” see David A. Super,
Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of
Antipoverty Law, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541 (2008).
43 Section 10201(i) of the ACA imposed some new procedural requirements
waivers, such that they now must be more transparent and undergo a process
resembling notice and comment. This procedural reform responds to a consistent
criticism that waiver negotiations between states and federal bureaucrats take
place under opaque conditions, with little input from the would-be beneficiaries.
Patient Protections and Affordable Care Act, Pub. Law No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119, § 1020(i) (2010).
44 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
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The decision to expand follows predictable partisan contours. To date,
thirty-one states have decided to adopt the ACA’s Medicaid expansion.45 The
mean 2008 Obama vote share in these states was 55.3 percentage points, and
most of these states — twenty-three of them — had a majority of the population
supporting Obama in the election. By comparison, the mean 2008 Obama
vote share in the states that have decided not to expand was 44.5 percentage
points, and majorities in nearly all of these states — fifteen of nineteen —
sided with Senator McCain in the 2008 election.46
Of the thirty-one states that have elected to expand Medicaid, seven did
so only after the CMS gave them a waiver.47 These waivers have tended to
make the Medicaid program more palatable to conservative constituents in two
primary ways. The first involves using Medicaid funding to allow beneficiaries
to buy private insurance on the state’s exchange — the so-called “private
option.” The second involves imposing a set of “personal responsibility”
requirements on beneficiaries: for example, premium-like payments, including
controversially a lockout period in the event of nonpayment, cost-sharing
provisions, or mandatory contributions to health savings accounts.48 The CMS
has also rejected a number of highly controversial waiver applications, most
notably proposals by Indiana and Pennsylvania to tie Medicaid benefits to
whether the beneficiary was working or searching for work.49 I consider the
legal dimension of such waivers toward the end of the Article, but for now
note that the standard view is that waivers created enough space between the
leaders of the implementing state and the ACA to make Medicaid expansion
acceptable for a range of states. Of course, whether they would have expanded
in any event is a critical question, interrogated later in this Article.50
45 As of September 1, 2015. See Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion
Decision, Henry J. Kaiser Family Found. (Sept. 14, 2015), http://kff.org/healthreform/state-indicator/state-activity-around-expanding-medicaid-under-theaffordable-care-act/#.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Wishner et al., supra note 6.
49 Id.
50 The states that have expanded through waiver tend ideologically to be somewhere
between those that unconditionally expand and those that unconditionally decline
to expand. The mean 2008 Obama vote share in these waiver states is 50.8
percentage points, almost six percentage points higher than the corresponding
figure for those that have declined to expand, and almost six percentage points
lower than the corresponding figure for those that unconditionally expanded. For
states’ expansion status, see supra note 45 and accompanying text; for Obama
vote shares, see, for example, Federal Elections 2008, Fed. Election Comm’n,
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II. State Politics and Safety Net Implementation
Although the flexibility afforded by waivers might, in principle, lead to either
more liberal or more conservative policies, I argue that, in general, flexibility
conjoined with the forces of state politics leads to a predicable conservative
trend in policy implementation. A number of factors make it likely that states
will seek waivers that reduce benefits in various ways.
A. Jurisdictional Competition
The longstanding concern among those who study welfare provision in
the United States is that competition between states will depress benefit
levels.51 The logic of this theory of jurisdictional competition is simple and
compelling: more generous benefits attract more beneficiaries, resulting in
tax burdens that eventually induce capital and labor flight and undermine the
state economy. Seeking to avoid this outcome, states engage in a “race to the
bottom,” undercutting benefits relative to other states.
Let us be clear that the empirical support for this theory is mixed. As a
preliminary matter, it is not clear that the migratory mechanism operates as
suggested. Much evidence suggests that inter-state migration is relatively
infrequent, and that when people move they think primarily of employment
and housing opportunities rather than benefits levels.52 Supporting this idea, a
recent study found that the Medicaid expansion states did not experience high
in-migration relative to states that did not expand Medicaid — this despite
massive differences in benefits between the two sets of states.53 Indeed, the
fact that a major policy concern is benefit take-up — that is, subscribing to
benefits within current jurisdictions — further substantiates the idea that the
migratory patterns of the relevant population may be fairly insensitive to
benefits levels.54 The proposed mechanism, therefore, is somewhat dubious.

51
52
53

54

http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2008/federalelections2008.shtml (last visited Jan.
10, 2017).
See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 16.
Robert E.B. Lucas, Internal Migration in Developed Countries, in Handbook
of Population and Family Economics 647 (Mark R. Rosenzweig & Oded Stark
eds., 1997).
Aaron L. Schwartz & Benjamin D. Sommers, Moving for Medicaid? Recent
Eligibility Expansions Did Not Induce Migration from Other States, 33 Health
Aff. 88 (2014); see also Jonah B. Gelbach, Migration, the Life Cycle, and State
Benefits: How Low Is the Bottom?, 112 J. Pol. Econ. 1091 (2004).
Anna Aizer, Low Take-Up in Medicaid: Does Outreach Matter and for Whom?,
93 Am. Econ. Rev. 238 (2003).
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Studies of policy outcomes also introduce doubt. The typical approach
to studying the race to the bottom hypothesis is to examine the sensitivity
of benefits levels of a given state to the benefits levels of surrounding states,
usually lagged by some interval. Some studies find evidence of such sensitivity,55
but others do not.56 This inconsistent pattern may be owing to differences in
the programs studied, or to the challenge of selecting the correct policy lag,
or to differences in the timing of the studies. In any event, the conclusion
that does emerge from this literature is that there is no strong and consistent
evidence that states are sensitive to safety net policies of neighboring states.
Notwithstanding the generally mixed evidence, it is impossible to deny
that some features of states’ policies appear to have been designed to forestall
in-migration. For example, California restricted welfare benefits for new
migrants. The plain purpose of this provision was to discourage those who
would move to generous states, such as California, for the welfare benefits
— or give the appearance of attempting to do so. The Supreme Court later
invalidated this policy as a violation of the right to travel in Saenz v. Roe.57
One explanation for the structure of such policies is that politicians are
extremely sensitive to the charge that they have opened the door to the
state becoming a so-called welfare magnet. That is, even if in-migration
is fundamentally not a concern, due for example to frictions of residential
mobility, and is unlikely to notably increase tax burdens or result in capital or
labor flight, even modest levels of in-migration may have important political
consequences. The political opposition may, for instance, express increases
in the welfare population in percentage terms, or in terms of the number of
additional dollars spent in aggregate, a number that is sure to sound large to
voters, even if it is small as a fraction of government revenue. So framed,
it is possible that the political consequences of safety net programs outstrip
their fiscal consequences, leading in any event to much the same outcome —
seeming fears of in-migration and a diminution of the safety net.

55 See, e.g., Michael A. Bailey & Mark Carl Rom, A Wider Race? Interstate
Competition Across Health and Welfare Programs, 66 J. Pol. 326 (2004).
56 See, e.g., William D. Berry et al., Reassessing the “Race to the Bottom” in State
Welfare Policy, 65 J. Pol. 327 (2003); Frank H. Buckley & Margaret F. Brinig,
Welfare Magnets: The Race for the Top, 5 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 141 (1997);
Craig Volden, The Politics of Competitive Federalism: A Race to the Bottom
in Welfare Benefits?, 46 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 352 (2002); Thomas Gais & R. Kent
Weaver, State Policy Choices Under Welfare Reform (Brookings Policy Brief
No. 21, 2002).
57 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
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B. State Budget Pressures
A second way in which state political forces may undermine safety net programs
through waiver relates to budget pressures. It is plain that safety nets have the
most use in economic downturns, as people lose jobs or otherwise experience
reduced incomes.58 But these same forces naturally also work against state
budget health in two ways: the decline in economic activity reduces state tax
revenue, and state programs — safety net programs in particular — experience
higher demand. So the states face the strongest budget pressure to control
spending and decrease services at precisely the time that safety nets have the
most value in blunting poverty and inequality.
All governments face this basic problem, but the issue is particularly acute
for state governments. Part of the problem for states plausibly relates to the
issue above — a limited ability to tax residents due to concerns of jurisdictional
competition. A dramatic increase in taxes designed to accommodate an expansion
of social services may, over time, induce flight to other states with lower tax
burdens. However, state governments also arguably face at least three further
related problems that the federal government does not. First, as non-issuers,
states cannot adapt monetary policy to changing economic conditions. Second,
most states have restrictions on governments’ spending or revenue-raising
ability,59 and much the same is true of their ability to borrow.60 Such provisions
likely constrain the ability of governments to expand social services in times
of economic downturn. Third, even absent these legal considerations, states
face higher borrowing costs than the federal government.61 Higher borrowing
58 Micah Hartman et al., National Health Spending in 2011: Overall Growth
Remains Low, But Some Payers and Services Show Signs of Acceleration, 32
Health Aff. 87 (2013).
59 A 2010 survey by the National Conference of State Legislatures found that
four states had revenue restrictions, twenty-three had spending restrictions, and
three had some combination of the two types of restrictions. Over half of these
restrictions are constitutional rather than statutory. See State Tax and Expenditure
Limits — 2010, Nat’l Conference of State Legislation, http://www.ncsl.org/
research/fiscal-policy/state-tax-and-expenditure-limits-2010.aspx (last visited
July 28, 2016).
60 James M. Poterba & Kim S. Rueben, Pub. Pol’y Inst. of Ca., Fiscal Rules and
State Borrowing Costs: Evidence from California and Other States (1999).
61 For instance, in March 2013, California issued ten-year bonds at a yield of 2.56%,
whereas the U.S. Treasury issued ten-year bonds at a yield of 1.96%. Long-Term
Government Bond Yields: 10-year: Main (Including Benchmark) for the United States,
Fred Econ. Data, https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/IRLTLT01USM156N
(last visited July 28, 2016). This difference reflects investors’ judgments about
the credit worthiness of the different government actors.
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costs, likewise, make it more difficult for state governments to implement
effective counter-cyclical policies.
Supporting this view, states’ policies appear to exhibit sensitivity to
economic downturns, reflecting these budget pressures. A recent report by
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) indicates that only seven states
decreased Medicaid benefits levels in 2008, before they could have adapted
to the Great Recession. As the recession hit, the same report reveals, the
number of states decreasing Medicaid benefits levels increased to twenty in
2009, twenty-four in 2010, and eighteen in 2011.62 Moreover, during this same
period, the federal government expanded fiscal programs, including assistance
to states — though evidently not at a level to forestall programmatic state
cuts. Although states do not necessarily need to apply for waivers to decrease
benefits levels, a permissive posture on waivers creates the possibility of
amplified policy responses to the business cycle that counter the purpose of
the safety net program.

III. Agency-State Bargaining
So far, I have argued that a permissive posture on waivers favors a form of
devolution that in theory encourages generally retrenching forces of state
implementation. This first point interacts with a second, which is that waivers,
if permissive, undermine the bargaining position of the federal agency. As I
have observed, waivers represent a forum for negotiation between the state
and some federal agency. Often, these parties will want different policies:
the federal agency, for instance, may view itself as the steward of the statute,
wishing to see full implementation of the statutory provisions; the state, by
contrast, may be subject to the forces described above, seeking to underimplement the statute in one way or another. The waiver application is a
forum for bargaining over these differences.63

62 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Medicaid: States Made Multiple Program
Changes, and Beneficiaries Generally Reported Access Comparable to Private
Insurance 18 (2012).
63 Although we might imagine the opposite configuration — with the federal agency
wishing to see under-implementation, and the state full implementation — this
is less likely for two primary reasons. First, it is unlikely that the state requires
a waiver to see full implementation; if the state simply wishes to implement the
full terms of the statute, that is, it need not request a waiver from the relevant
agency. Second, as argued above, the forces of state implementation generally
lean toward limiting benefits or eligibility.
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A. The Problem
In the service of obtaining a waiver, a standard argument that a conservative
state might make is that, given some feature of state politics or finances,
it needs the waiver to implement (or continue to implement) any version
of the policy. For example, states often declare that a waiver is necessary
given budget pressures.64 State posturing around Medicaid expansion under
the ACA represents a clear example of this type of dynamic: conservative
state administrations have argued that, without a waiver admitting of some
personal responsibility requirement, it is politically impossible to move
expansion through the relevant state institution; the legislature, for instance,
will balk at the notion of expanding Medicaid absent the waiver.65 This may
or may not be true. However, the federal agency, the CMS in this case, has a
poor read on whether it is true, and in this sense the bargaining occurs in an
environment of incomplete information.
The fact that the waiver application is a forum for agency-state bargaining
is nearly self-evident, but this point about information has virtually escaped
attention in the literature. Scholars have gestured to the issue: for example,
Suzan Bennett and Kathleen Sullivan observe that many state welfare reforms,
also proceeding through waivers, “appear merely to be attempts to reduce
benefits under the guise of experimentation.”66 Yet the problem is fundamental
to the institution of waivers. Despite being experts in their policy areas, federal
bureaucrats face severe information problems with respect to states: critically,
they do not know the realities of state politics, and they do not understand
state budgets. This means that when a state says that it needs a waiver to
implement a federal policy — due to state politics or budget issues — the
federal agency will not easily be able to determine the truthfulness of the
statement. The state may, in fact, need the waiver; but it is also possible that
the state is pursuing the waiver for gratuitous ideological reasons, unrelated to
feasibility. In this context, the posture agencies adopt with respect to waiver
applications is critical. I present a simple model reflecting this argument in
the Article’s Appendix.

64 See, e.g., Wood v. Betlach, 922 F. Supp. 2d 836 (D. Ariz. 2013).
65 See infra Section III.B.
66 Bennett & Sullivan, supra note 41, at 745.
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B. Bargaining Example
As an illustration of the type of bargaining that might take place in this waiver
context, consider Pennsylvania’s application for its Medicaid expansion waiver.67
There, the state argued that “to provide quality, affordable health care services
to Pennsylvania’s most vulnerable citizens, Pennsylvania must transform its
Medicaid program,” noting that the program “requires substantial new state
revenue on an ongoing basis,” and that it places a “burden on the taxpayers”
and makes it “difficult to fund other critical program areas, such as education.”68
According to the application, the state wished to continue “its pursuit of
innovative reforms”69 through the waiver, principally by using Medicaid
funds to provide premium assistance for private insurance (i.e., the “private
option”), and by imposing various personal responsibility requirements on
beneficiaries.70 With respect to personal responsibility, the waiver application
most controversially included an “encouraging employment program,” which
made employment or participation in a job-training program a condition for
receiving Medicaid benefits.71 But it also proposed that beneficiaries pay
premiums, and included a “lockout” period of up to nine months for those who
failed to pay.72 These and other concessions, the state maintained, represented
“[p]rogram innovations and reforms [that] are necessary to improve health
outcomes and ensure sustainability so that an adequate and appropriate health
care safety net can be provided for those who need it.”73
This waiver application thus fits the basic mold: a request to privatize, reduce
benefits, or require cost sharing, along with a gloss of program “innovation,”
combined with ominous references to program sustainability and other budget
priorities. The looming implicit feature of this application was Republican
control of both the governor’s office and state legislature, and the threat that
the state would not expand Medicaid under the ACA absent some concessions.74
The validity of these threats was difficult to discern: was the budget truly
67 Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, Healthy Pennsylvania 1115 Demonstration Application
(2013) (on file with author).
68 Id. at 10.
69 Id. at 5.
70 E.g., id. at 13-14.
71 Id. at 13.
72 Id. at 90.
73 Id. at 6.
74 See, e.g., Wishner et al., supra note 6, at 13 (noting that the governor “initially
faced significant opposition in the legislature but eventually was able to garner
the support he needed [for Medicaid expansion]. He framed the plan as a ‘private
coverage option.’”).
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imperiled and was program sustainability in question? If the CMS plays
hardball, refusing concessions, would the state fold and expand Medicaid?
The state, of course, was in a much better position than the CMS to know
the details of the state budget, as well as the personalities and preferences of
the relevant local political figures.
Though CMS disapproved of the most controversial components of
Pennsylvania’s application — notably, the employment condition and the
lockout period — it largely approved the fundamentals of the proposal,
freeing the state to pursue its version of the “private option” and allowing
it to require premiums of beneficiaries.75 Most observers view the waiver
in a positive light; this represents an example of the sort of sorely needed
pragmatic bipartisan deal-making that waivers facilitate. Nevertheless, the
question presses — were the concessions necessary to win Medicaid expansion
in Pennsylvania? Did the budget in fact require the sort of “innovations”
contained in the application?
Even in hindsight, these questions remain fraught and uncertain — indeed,
that is the nature of the type of informational problem agencies confront. Yet
we have at least some strong suggestive evidence that the application played
up the problems posed by the standard Medicaid package. Less than a year
after Pennsylvania submitted its waiver application, a Democrat, Tom Wolf,
won the governorship. Soon after taking office, he produced a timeline for
rolling back the waiver and implementing a traditional Medicaid program.
The transition to traditional Medicaid was completed in fall 2015.76 Though
not conclusive — perhaps this traditional expansion foretells some future
budgetary calamity — it at least suggests that the application overstated its
concerns about program sustainability. It also undermines the thesis that state
politics could not support expansion under a traditional Medicaid package.
C. Bargaining Discussion
Though simple, the recognition of this problem provides insight into several
important features of waivers and state-agency interactions. The initial
75 For a comparison of the submitted and approved plans, see Joe Markosek, House
Appropriations Comm., Gov. Corbett’s Healthy PA Submitted vs. Approved Plan,
PAHouse.com (Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.pahouse.com/Files/Documents/
Appropriations/series/2817/DPW_HealthyPA_Comparison_FF_091014.pdf.
76 See, e.g., Damon C. Williams, State Completes Technical Aspect of Medicaid
Expansion, Phila. Trib., Sept. 11, 2015, http://www.phillytrib.com/news/statecompletes-technical-aspect-of-medicaid-expansion/article_7fba4d5e-1f4d-510987c7-f1e0c1e8c7e6.html.
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observation is in line with the existing literature: waivers can be helpful,
both for states and for the federal government. For example, as explained
above, and further discussed in the Appendix, the question in the context of
the ACA and Medicaid expansion is whether waivers permit conservative
states to expand Medicaid when they otherwise would not do so for political or
budgetary reasons. If properly calibrated, waivers can filter out the states that
require waivers to expand from those that do not, improving outcomes for all
involved. However, the problem extends beyond the ACA and characterizes
bargaining dynamics when the states and agencies have different preferences
— as will often be the case — and the states enjoy an information advantage
over some relevant characteristic of the proposal — as again will often be
the case. For example, again if properly calibrated, waivers might filter out
those states that seek to cut benefits for ideological reasons from those that
seek to improve safety net delivery.77
As a corollary, however, waivers can at times be distinctly unhelpful if not
properly calibrated, a point not sufficiently integrated into this recent literature
on waivers. If the government’s posture toward waivers is too permissive, it
encourages states to misrepresent their intentions — to say they are “innovating”
in some relevant respect, but in reality to retrench safety net programs or
pursue ideological ends. This process is likely to be encouraged by — and to
encourage — forces operating at the state level that generally work against
robust safety nets. Moreover, this occurs even if the federal government is a
“good actor,” doing its best to approve only the appropriate waivers. It results
not from agency malfeasance or sabotage, but from underlying problems of
information; the states have much better information about their proposals and
the relevant local political and economic factors than the federal government;
at least under a permissive waiver regime, this allows the states to sometimes
pull one over on the federal government.
77 To more fully explain the mapping to this scenario, in the Appendix, the federal
agency does not know how the proposal will play out in the state; say, w now
reflects whether the waiver will improve delivery or simply eliminate benefits,
which depends on difficult-to-observe state-level factors. The federal agency
only wishes to grant the waiver if the state conditions support improved delivery:
granting the waiver to a benefit-cutting state results in less than ideal policy, and
denying a waiver to an innovating state also results in less than ideal policy, as
the need for innovation may be spurred by changes in the state that make the
“standard” policy inadequate. However, the agency does not observe whether
the state conditions reflect cost-cutting incentives or innovating incentives, and
the states themselves always reference the flexibility afforded by the waiver (but
for different reasons). This gives rise to essentially the same analysis, as shown
above and in the Appendix, which is targeted to the expansion waiver context.
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Another straightforward corollary is that complete opposition to waivers —
perhaps on the grounds of national uniformity — is also not the most fruitful
approach. This restrictive approach neglects the underlying heterogeneity
in state conditions that, at times, call for tailored solutions through waivers.
Failing to tailor in this fashion, as suggested above, may result in policy that
is worse for both the state and the federal agency, not to mention beneficiaries.
The critical question, then, is how to calibrate waivers so that they encourage
requests from the “right” kinds of states and not from the “wrong” kinds of
states. I now consider this issue of calibration.

IV. Managing Waivers
Waivers represent not simple devolution, but instead managed devolution.
They are managed in two important respects. First, the relevant federal
agency must approve the waiver. The way in which agencies manage waivers
— demanding more or less from applications — represents an important
management device, as suggested above. I discuss administrative procedures
that might be helpful at the agency level in Section A below, but agencylevel management is of limited value if an agency is politically committed
to a loose waiver regime or the consequent policy outcomes. For instance,
though the Obama administration rejected Pennsylvania’s request to condition
Medicaid benefits on employment or job training, it is easy to imagine other
administrations endorsing or even encouraging such innovations. Indeed,
when Vice President Pence was Governor of Indiana, the state proposed a
similar work requirement (also rejected by the Obama Administration).78 This
stresses the question of what the limits on waivers might be. Our response
to this question turns on the second form of management — judicial review,
which is discussed in Section B.
A. Administrative Procedures
The basic objective of administrative procedures in this context is twofold:
first, to help agencies overcome informational problems, particularly as
relates to the states; and second, to help courts conduct meaningful review
of agency actions.
Recently, Congress has taken important steps to improve the procedures
surrounding waivers — at least, Section 1115 demonstration waivers, which
78 See Ind. Family & Soc. Serv. Admin., HIP 2.0 1115 Waiver Application (July
2, 2014), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/
By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/in/Healthy-Indiana-Plan-2/in-healthyindiana-plan-support-20-Waiver-Application-07022014.pdf.
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historically have perhaps been viewed as the most potent form of waivers.79
Section 10201(i) of the ACA amended Section 1115 of the Social Security
Act to require agencies to promulgate regulations that provide for notice-andcomment type procedures at both the state and federal levels for most waivers.
The Department of Health and Human Services — the parent agency of the
CMS — issued such regulations on February 27, 2012.80 At the state level,
the regulations provide minimum transparency requirements: states must give
notice of the waiver application on their website, as well as the state register
or in state newspapers; must allow at least thirty days for public commenting;
and must hold at least two public hearings.81 Once the CMS has received
the application, the agency, likewise, must give notice of the application by
posting it on its website, and notifying parties through list-serves or the like;
allow at least thirty days for public commenting; wait at least forty-five days
from the date of receipt before approving the application; and maintain an
administrative record on its website.82
These procedures undoubtedly ameliorate both of the relevant problems: they
help level information all around, making agencies more the equal of states,
and courts more the equal of agencies. Still, they represent a sort of notice-andcomment “lite,” and they might be further strengthened in a number of ways.83
Most relevant, they do not sufficiently force the state and federal agencies to
consider and justify the merits of the application, thereby diminishing both
the deliberative benefits afforded by procedures as well as the ability of courts
to conduct meaningful review. For example, the regulations require the state
to give public notice only thirty days before submission,84 and it is unclear
how seriously the state agency must take any comments it receives during this
short window.85 The procedures at the federal level seem, if anything, even
more slapdash on this deliberative dimension. Again, as at the state level, the
deliberative window between the end of the comment period and earliest date
of approval is vanishingly short, fifteen days.86 Even more disturbing, at the
79 See supra note 25.
80 Review and Approval Process for Section 1115 Demonstrations, 77 Fed. Reg.
11,678 (2012).
81 Id., codified at 42 C.F.R. § 431.408.
82 Id., codified at 42 C.F.R. § 431.416.
83 Here, I refer to the procedures for ordinary rulemaking, 5 U.S.C. § 553.
84 42 C.F.R. § 431.408(A)(2)(ii).
85 42 C.F.R. § 431.412(a)(1)(viii) provides that, for initial projects, the state
must include a “report of the issues raised by the public during the comment
period . . . and how the state considered those comments when developing the
demonstration application.”
86 The agency must wait forty-five days from the time the application is received,
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federal level, is that the agency disavows any duty to address issues raised
in comments: “CMS will review and consider all comments received by the
deadline,” the regulations reassure, “but will not provide written responses
to public comments.”87 The agency is, of course, less likely to take comments
seriously if it does not have to provide responses to them.
B. Judicial Review
The case law on waivers is, as yet, fairly thin, particularly post-ACA reforms.88
As an illustration of how judicial review might falter in the face of weak
administrative procedures, though, consider the recent case of Wood v. Betlach.89
The case suggests the ways in which more searching scrutiny of waiver
approvals might induce state actors to promote statutory objectives.
By way of background, in 2011, the Secretary approved a waiver application
from Arizona seeking to impose higher copayments on a segment of beneficiaries.90

87
88

89
90

42 C.F.R. § 431.416(e)(1), but is taking comments for thirty of those days, 42
C.F.R. § 431.416(b).
42 C.F.R. 431.416(d).
An early case, often cited for the view that courts deferentially review waivers,
is Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1000 (2d Cir. 1973), dealing with the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, which was subject to the
same demonstration project waiver provision as Medicaid. It involved the question
of whether the then-operative agency, the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW), could grant a waiver to New York that conditioned welfare
benefits on a work requirement. Several would-be beneficiaries argued, among
other things, that the waiver was contrary to the relevant statute; the Secretary
disagreed. The court deferred to the agency and rejected the challenge to the
waiver. In so doing, Judge Friendly, writing for the panel, nodded to the political
issues involved in this case, noting that the Secretary may
properly take into account the growing antagonism to the welfare system
and the possibility that, unless the public is satisfied that every reasonable
effort is being made to induce employable recipients of assistance to
work, pressure on governors and legislatures . . . [might cause additional
curtailment in benefits] . . . with far greater ultimate hardship than these
[waiver-facilitated] projects may entail.
Id. at 1103. This political argument — which relied on the state’s representation
of the political environment and presumably informed the subsequent deferential
statutory analysis — is strikingly similar to the arguments now advanced in
favor of granting waivers to states.
Wood v. Betlach, No. CV-12-08098-PCT-DGC (D. Ariz. July 26, 2013); Wood
v. Betlach, 922 F. Supp. 2d 836 (D. Ariz. 2013).
These higher payments applied to the expansion population consisting of
beneficiaries that states may optionally cover under the Medicaid program.
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The beneficiaries who would be subject to these higher copayments sought
an injunction against the waiver. Initially, the court approved some aspects
of the waiver, and found others wanting under arbitrariness review.91 The
court remanded without vacatur, and on remand the Secretary reaffirmed her
decision. Following this agency action, the plaintiffs challenged again, and
the court granted summary judgment to the Secretary.92
On review, focus tends toward two questions: first, whether the agency
had the statutory authority to approve the waiver; and, second, whether the
agency behaved arbitrarily in granting a waiver. Post ACA, a third question
seems likely to become more important, that is, whether the waiver was granted
consistently with the agency’s self-generated procedural requirements.93 This
third question, however, is not relevant to this case, as it arrives before the
ACA reforms.
i. Statutory Authority
On the statutory question, permissibility turns on the particulars of the relevant
granted waiver and waiver authority. At least in the context of Section 1115
waivers, the statutory analysis is largely guided by the requirement that, for
the Secretary to grant a waiver request, the requested waiver must “in the
judgment of the Secretary, [be] likely to assist in promoting the objectives of
[the Act].”94 Notice that this language somewhat limits courts’ ability to review
the substance of the agency’s decision, and so the operative question courts
have examined is how searching the Secretary’s assessment of the issue was.
With respect to the objectives of Medicaid, the Social Security Act provides
that the purpose of the program is, in part, “to furnish . . . medical assistance
on behalf of families with dependent children and of aged, blind, or disabled
individuals, whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs
of necessary medical services.”95 This objective clearly admits a large zone
Betlach, 922 F. Supp. 2d.
Betlach, No. CV-12-08098-PCT-DGC.
E.g., 42 C.F.R. § 431.416.
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2014). In fact, courts have articulated
what amounts to a three-prong analysis of waivers, asking whether the Secretary
examined: (1) whether the waiver had an experimental or demonstration
component; (2) whether the waiver was likely to promote the objectives of the
act; and (3) the extent and period necessary for the project. See Beno v. Shalala,
30 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 1994); Newton-Nations v. Betlach, 660 F.3d 370 (9th
Cir. 2011). This Article focuses on the second of these prongs, as it is probably
the most far-reaching potential management vehicle.
95 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1.

91
92
93
94
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of discretion. For example, a waiver might expand eligibility to new people,
but at the cost of reduced benefits for those already covered by the program.
The statute does not seem to speak to this tradeoff.
In Betlach, the court tripped over this statutory question — if a waiver, on
the whole, promotes the objectives of the act, is that enough? Or must every
component of a waiver promote its objectives? Or is there some third way
of construing the issue? This is a challenging and important set of questions,
but the Betlach court took the essentially conclusory view that “[it] is not
persuaded that copayments challenged as part of a larger demonstration project
must independently merit approval under Section 1115.”96 The court reasoned
that “[t]o so hold would mean that any provision of a larger demonstration
project could be challenged as not independently warranting approval under
Section 1115, notwithstanding that provision’s relationship to and interaction
with the project as a whole.”97 To be fair, I am not aware of any court that
considered the issue in more detail than this.
But clearly, on the one hand, requiring each component independently
to meet the relevant criteria is likely to defeat virtually any waiver request
that involves tradeoffs, for example, lower benefits for expanded eligibility.
This seems to be the animating concern in Betlach. Still, on the other hand,
permitting the Secretary to consider the waiver program as a whole invites
states to attach unnecessary ideological, retrenching, or political “riders” to
applications that otherwise promote the Act’s objectives. Allowing the Secretary
to examine merely the question of whether the waiver would, considered as a
whole, promote the Act’s objectives plainly encourages state gamesmanship
that itself runs contrary to the Act. This perspective received no airing in the
Betlach court’s opinion.
I want to suggest that one need not accept either the component-bycomponent perspective or the as-a-whole perspective. Consider the possibility
that the Secretary, and therefore the courts on review, engages in a sort of
“severability” analysis.98 The relevant question, then, in this analysis is whether
the component inconsistent with the Act’s objectives may be severed without
undermining the other features of the request. Sometimes the contrary feature
96 Betlach, 922 F. Supp. 2d at 843.
97 Id.
98 In the statutory context, see, for example, Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S.
678, 107 S. Ct. 1476 (1987). For a recent article considering the administrative
context, see Charles W. Tyler & Donald Elliott, Administrative Severability
Clauses, 124 Yale L.J. 2286 (2015) (calling for courts to defer to agencies’
views regarding severability; note that the present context differs in that it seeks
to have agencies conduct a severability analysis themselves of states’ proposals).
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is necessary to buy the promoting features; but at other times it will not be.
Absent such an analysis, at least on important components of the request, the
Secretary’s approval of the waiver should be deemed arbitrary and capricious.
This sort of analysis was entirely absent from the Betlach decision, but
it would have led to a different outcome, as the Secretary apparently did not
engage in the inquiry.99 Moreover, substantively, it is likely that the Secretary
would have been forced to conclude that the relevant copayment provision
was severable. The state justified the copayments by arguing that they were
necessary to contain costs and ensure the sustainability of coverage for the
relevant segment of the population. If copayments were in fact necessary to
ensure program sustainability, they would not be severable; but if they were
not, then they should be severed and considered independently.
Most research suggests that, at least for Medicaid beneficiaries, copayments
alter behavior but do not reduce state expenditures.100 A study of a program
affecting a population similar to Medicaid beneficiaries in Quebec found that
requiring copayments for prescription drugs reduced use of prescription drugs,
but also led to higher use of hospitals and emergency rooms;101 similarly, a
study of Oregon’s experience with copayments for Medicaid beneficiaries
found that they led to decreases in some services, such as prescription drugs,
but increases in others, such as inpatient care, with, on average, no change in
expenditures per beneficiary.102 These studies indicate that the copayments rule
99 In her initial decision, the Secretary did not consider the argument that copayments
do not reduce expenditures, and this failing, in part, led to the remand (without
vacatur) in Betlach, 922 F. Supp. 2d at 850. However, this took place in the
generic setting of arbitrariness review, examining whether the Secretary considered
evidence presented during administrative proceedings. On remand, the Secretary
approved the original waiver application, and this time in her approval letter
“reference[d] these objections and conclude[d] otherwise.” Wood v. Betlach,
No. CV-12-08098-PCT-DGC (D. Ariz. July 26, 2013). Of course, this cursory
analysis by the Secretary, as conveyed by the reviewing court, begs the question,
as the entire issue is whether copayments lead to savings. In any event, the court
found this level of consideration — reference plus conclusion — sufficient to
overcome arbitrariness review. Betlach, No. CV-12-08098-PCT-DGC.
100 See, e.g., Leighton Ku & Victoria Wachino, Ctr. on Budget & Pol’y Priorities,
The Effect of Increased Cost-Sharing in Medicaid: A Summary of Research
Findings (2005).
101 Robyn Tamblyn et al., Adverse Events Associated with Prescription Drug CostSharing Among Poor and Elderly Persons, 285 J. Am. Med. Ass’n 421 (2001).
102 Neal T. Wallace et al., How Effective Are Copayments in Reducing Expenditures
for Low-Income Adult Medicaid Beneficiaries? Experience from the Oregon
Health Plan, 43 Health Serv. & Res. 515 (2008).
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should have been severed from the remainder of the application, as they were
unlikely to promote cost savings or program sustainability. And considered
independently of savings, it is difficult to see how the copayments might
promote the objectives of the Act.
This type of severability analysis runs into a problem of information similar
to that noted above, that is, that the court does not have good information
about what can be severed and what cannot. This is, indeed, why more
formal administrative procedures have such importance. The dialog between
the agency and the public — segments of which will likely have relevant
knowledge — in the administrative record promises to greatly enhance the
ability of courts to resolve such questions. This point also illustrates why it
is problematic for an agency to opt out of providing responses to comments,103
a procedural shortcoming that calls for reform.
ii. Arbitrariness
The second legal question is more garden variety, and represents a longstanding
question in administrative law — how searching should the Secretary’s analysis
be? In the context of waivers, how much evidence should the agency demand
of the state before approving a waiver? The Betlach court ends up deferring
to the agency in this respect, too, seemingly requiring little of the Secretary.
But this form of deference is not required of courts, and here it might have
led to a different outcome.
Consider the state’s justification for the waiver: program sustainability.
The Secretary ended up siding with this view. Here, I do not want to question
the substantive validity of that view — which may or may not be there — but
instead the level of evidence that the Secretary required of the state before
siding with its view. It appears that the initial agency approval arrived on
the basis of a letter from the Governor of Arizona stating that the state had
a budget crisis and that the program must be reformed “to assure its future
sustainability.”104 Outside of this letter, the agency does not appear to have had
any other evidence from the state supporting its position that the copayments
rule was necessary to save the program: for example, no exhibits from budget
experts, no study of the agency budget.
I have already identified one area in which the Secretary’s analysis might
have been more searching: on the connection between copayments and program
savings. To the court’s credit, the initial litigation led to a remand, in part,
on this basis; but the agency action on remand seems to have approved the
waiver with only the barest acknowledgment of the issue, an acknowledgment
103 42 C.F.R. 431.416(d).
104 Betlach, 922 F. Supp. 2d at 849.
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that won the agency summary judgment in the subsequent litigation. Given
studies finding little connection between copayments and cost savings, the
court would have been on solid ground to remand again for a more serious
analysis of the issue.
The court’s relaxed posture manifests elsewhere, too. One fact to emerge
in the course of litigation was that, for the fiscal year preceding the waiver
application, the state’s Medicaid program, in fact, ran a surplus of $167,000,000.105
The court brushed off this revelation, on the grounds that “it was not part of
the information before the agency at the time of the Secretary’s decision.”106
But the agency was plainly in the position to require the state to make some
showing — beyond a letter from the Governor — of the pressing budget
problems supposedly requiring the imposition of copayments. The approval
might easily have been set aside under arbitrariness review on the basis that
the agency apparently did little due diligence.
***
The problems that manifest in the Betlach litigation reflect the concerns of
the first portions of this Article. In particular, we have a state wishing to cut
back on Medicaid benefits by imposing copayments. The forces driving this
state request are likely multiple, but plausibly owe, at least in part, to the
considerations in Part II. Even more evident are the information problems
discussed in Part III. In the Betlach litigation, a core issue was whether the state
required the benefits cuts to ensure program sustainability. The state asserted
this fact, and the agency, under a permissive waiver regime, seems to have
simply believed the assertion. The court followed suit. However, considerable
evidence emerged in the course of litigation that, first, the program was not
imposing a burden on the budget, and, second, in any event copayments were
unlikely to improve the budget situation. Arizona, that is, appears to have failed
to support the claimed budget rationale for the cuts, and a permissive approach
to waivers allowed benefits cuts to ride on the unsubstantiated rationale. But as
I suggest, more demanding doctrinal approaches — particularly if combined
with more robust administrative procedures — may well be able to separate
states such as Arizona from those that require cuts or other forms of policy
innovation to promote the objectives of the Act.

105 Id.
106 Id.
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Conclusion
Even as the problem of economic inequality is largely one of explosive growth
in the right tail of the distribution, the left tail of the distribution also calls
for particular attention. It is the left tail that bears the brunt of the economic
changes producing inequality; it is the left tail where society has a moral
obligation to ensure minimum standards of wellbeing; it is the left tail where
we should be particularly eager to see signs of intergenerational mobility.
In the United States, states and the federal government jointly set many
aspects of social service policy — they jointly set the policies, that is, that
target the left tail of the distribution. As a window into this policymaking
environment, I have examined Medicaid implementation, and in particular
Medicaid expansion following the ACA. Medicaid holds great interest due
to the size of the policy program — over 500 billion dollars in 2015107 — as
well as its association with improvements in health, education, income, and
intergenerational mobility in beneficiaries.108 At core, the question in this
implementation architecture is whether we want more or less flexibility in
the state-federal relationship given concerns over inequality. Of late, scholars
have taken a relatively positive view of flexibility in the policymaking system.
A critical vehicle of policymaking flexibility is the administrative waiver,
the subject of much discussion in academic and policy circles. Through this
device, an implementing federal agency might waive statutory requirements
that otherwise are binding on states. Those on both the left and the right
have lauded the device: it opens a door to bipartisanship and permits policy
innovation in the face of a gridlocked Congress. Waivers indeed offer a
tempting alternative to the grind and rancor of legislation.
Yet insofar as one focuses on the vitality of safety net programs, waivers
should be watched with a wary eye rather than cheered. The forces that operate
at the level of state implementation tend to work towards cuts, and due to
information problems federal administrators will have difficulty filtering out
the meritorious applications from the non-meritorious applications. Moreover,
as illustrated by litigation surrounding a recent waiver granted to Arizona,
courts hardly represent a failsafe to protect statutory objectives. Recent reforms
to administrative procedures hold promise, but they remain incomplete and
should be amplified.

107 See Total Medicaid Spending, Fiscal Year 2015, Henry Kaiser J. Family Found.,
http://kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/total-medicaid-spending/?dataView=0&
currentTimeframe=0 (last visited Dec. 9, 2016).
108 See Brown et al., supra note 4.
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policy. Players then receive payoffs.
The policy payoffs thus depend on the policy selected and the underlying
state conditions, as follows, first for the federal government, G:

" 1 if
$
UG = # 0 if
$ −1 if
%

P=F
P=L

P=A

And likewise for the state, S:

" 1 if
$
U S = # 0 if
$ −1 if
%

P=L

P=F

P=A

Thus, neither the agency nor even the state wants to see the policy
abandoned, but as indicated above they have different views on how
generous to make the safety net program: the agency wants the most
possible given state conditions; the state wants the lowest level of policy
regardless of state conditions. Note that P defaults to A if the state-agency
negotiation results in a policy choice that the state cannot support.
The objective of the analysis is to consider salient perfect Bayesian
equilibria of this state-agency bargaining interaction under various waiver
regimes, where the regimes, again, find definition in the request costs.
B. Overly Permissive Waiver Regime
Consider initially the problems with an overly permissive waiver regime.
Behaviorally, the defining characteristic of this waiver regime is that states
in both conditions find it equally attractive to request waivers. This
characteristic would follow, for instance, if k = t = 0 , so that neither type
of state incurs a cost for requesting a waiver. More generally, any time that
k < 1 the incentives generating these equilibria prevail.
That states of both types pool and find it worth requesting waivers gives rise
to the possibility of a troubling equilibrium in which the federal agency
indiscriminately accepts all applications. In particular, if π <

1
, an
2

equilibrium exists in which states in both conditions request waivers, and
the agency indiscriminately accepts the requests. The agency does so
because, even though the application is uninformative, there is a good
chance ( 1− π ) that the state condition is ω = L and that the application is
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truthful; for these states, rejecting the application would lead to an
unappealing abandonment of the policy. Of course, this equilibrium is not
particularly attractive for the federal government because, in many cases,
states under-implement the statute when they are in a position to fully
implement it. Yet the agency cannot easily ferret out these underimplementing states, and so ends up granting all waivers.
To see this more clearly, note that the agency cannot update beliefs due to
the pooling strategies of states, so it must act based on priors. Under the
candidate strategy of accepting the applications, it faces a payoff of 0, that
is, because P=L. However, if the agency rejects the application, it faces a
payoff of 𝜋𝜋 − (1 − 𝜋𝜋), such that we have P=A if 𝜔𝜔 = 𝐿𝐿, and P=F if 𝜔𝜔 = 𝐹𝐹.

Thus, so long as π <

1
, the agency faces no incentive to deviate from the
2

strategy of indiscriminately accepting all applications. The states, likewise,
plainly face no incentive to deviate, as they are able to under-implement the
statute, as is their preference, and the cost of applying, k, is less than 1.
If π >

1
and 𝑘𝑘 < 1 there is also an equilibrium in which the L states
2

always request waivers, and the F states mix, applying with probability

1− π
, and the agency accepts the request with probability k . Note that the
π

F-type state is indifferent between applying and not, and thus faces no
incentive to deviate: that is, applying yields 𝜌𝜌 + 1 − 𝜌𝜌 0 − 𝑘𝑘, where 𝜌𝜌
is the probability that the agency accepts the waiver; and not applying yields
0; thus, if 𝜌𝜌 = 𝑘𝑘, the F-type state is indifferent. The agency, meanwhile, is
also indifferent: accepting the application yields 0; and denying it yields,
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋 1 + (1 − 𝜋𝜋)(−1), where 𝜓𝜓 is the probability that the F-type state
678
applies; so that when 𝜓𝜓 =
, the agency is indifferent between accepting
8
and rejecting the application. The L-type state, it is clear, faces no incentive
to deviate.
C. Overly Harsh Waiver Regime
On the other side of regimes, consider a harsh waiver regime in which it is
incredibly difficult for states to request waivers. Indeed, this might be
thought of as a no-waiver regime. But to maintain the focus on request costs,
let k − t > 1 ; this means that, even for states in condition ω = L , the costs
of seeking a waiver exceed any possible benefit.
The relevant strategies to consider in this regime are straightforward: for
states in both conditions, do not request a waiver. As suggested, the costs of
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doing so exceed any possible benefit, and as a result neither state faces an
incentive to deviate from these do-not-request strategies. The downside of
this equilibrium, of course, is that some states truly require a waiver to
operate the safety net program, and in this way refusing waivers results in
an unnecessary diminution of the program.
D. Effective Waiver Regime
An effective waiver regime lies between the two extremes above: it neither
encourages all states to request, nor does it discourage all states to request.
Rather, it encourages the right kind of states to request a waiver. In the
running example of this model, that is, it encourages states in condition
ω = L to apply, and those in condition ω = F not to apply. This form of
effective waiver regime, therefore, is moderate, neither permissive nor
harsh.
This regime is characterized by request costs that have two features: first,
k > 1 , which has the effect of discouraging the states in condition ω = F
from requesting a waiver, and, second, k − t < 1 , which has the effect of
encouraging states in condition ω = L to request a waiver. The states
formulate strategies to this effect, and the federal agency, then, on seeing a
waiver, knows that it is from a state that cannot effectively implement the
full benefits program, and therefore grants the waiver. As can be readily
verified, no type of state has an incentive to deviate from this equilibrium.

